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The Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process was established 
to provide an early warning and tracking capability for protecting Department of Defense 
(DoD) networks against identified system vulnerabilities.  The Navy initially used record 
message traffic for the information distribution required by the process.  This approach 
was heavily administrative and prone to significant delays in an already time critical 
process.  Additionally, it lacked support for automated data validation, resulting in 
unreliable vulnerability tracking information.  As a result, the process was ineffective, 
and Navy networks remained highly susceptible to exploitation, even for well-
documented system vulnerabilities.  For this thesis, web-enabling technology is used to 
build and deploy an early warning and tracking system for Navy network vulnerabilities.  
The research sponsor, the Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense 
(NCTF-CND), has named it the Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS).  It is now 
being used by all Navy commands and has proven efficient and highly effective in 
defending Navy networks against known vulnerability exploitations.  As a result, the 
system has gained significant interest from other organizations and the research sponsor 
is now planning to fund maintenance and future enhancements by the Space and Naval 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis continues previous work done by the author to establish the 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) dissemination and reporting process 
within the Navy.  This chapter describes the process and then, based on the author’s first-
hand experience, details the problems with the Navy’s initial implementation.  Next, a 
web-based approach to resolving the original problems is discussed, which leads to a 
preview of the solution that was developed during this research.  And finally, a brief 
overview of the remaining chapters is provided. 
A. INFORMATION ASSURANCE VULNERABILITY ALERT PROCESS 
The Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process was established in June 
1998.  It was done in response to Assistant Secretary of Defense direction that all 
Department of Defense (DoD) Commanders in Chief (CINCs), Services, and Agencies 
establish a dissemination and compliance tracking capability for protecting defense 
networks against system vulnerabilities.  The process is primarily intended to protect 
against well-known vulnerabilities, like network system buffer overflows, that are prone 
to exploitation by third party threats, especially hackers.  As the designated agent for the 
process, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is responsible for issuing 
vulnerability messages to all services and agencies.  This begins the early warning phase 
of the process, alerting network action officers to a potential vulnerability with installed 
network systems.  Each of the services and agencies is then responsible for their own 
internal distribution of vulnerability messages.  The Navy Component Task Force for 
Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND) is responsible for internal notification 
throughout the Navy. 
Each vulnerability message contains procedures for securing systems against an 
identified vulnerability.  When a vulnerability message is issued, organizations are 
required to inventory their vulnerable systems and to follow the prescribed procedures to 
protect those systems that are affected.  Individual commands are then responsible for 
submitting reports detailing their vulnerability compliance status.  This starts the tracking 
phase of the process, for monitoring the status of vulnerable network systems.  
Compliance reports are required to include vulnerable system inventories as categorized 
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by total number of systems, number of affected systems, number of corrected systems, 
and the number waived due to special circumstances.  For the Navy, the reports are 
submitted, via the appropriate chain of command, to the Navy Component Task Force for 
Computer Network Defense.  They, in turn, compile the data contained in the individual 
reports and submit a Navy-wide compliance status report to the Defense Information 
Systems Agency.  The entire notification and reporting process must be completed, with 
vulnerabilities corrected and reported, within a specified time frame, usually 30 days. 
1. Problems with the Navy’s Early Warning Phase 
Vulnerability notification is a time critical function because there are only 30 days 
to complete the reporting process for the entire Navy.  The fundamental objective is to 
get known vulnerability information into the hands of appropriate network action officers 
as quickly as possible.  Doing so provides the greatest opportunity to take action and 
defend against potential exploitation.  One of the major challenges for the Navy is to 
quickly distribute vulnerability messages to network action officers at all commands.  
This has proven to be particularly difficult due to the Navy’s organizational structure and 
the exceptionally large number of commands. 
The primary method used to distribute administrative information throughout the 
Navy (and other military services) is record message traffic.  It is essentially a wire 
service that uses a standard text-based format and provides a global distribution system.  
In recent years, the addition of networks at most Navy commands has improved local 
record message traffic distribution.  Incoming messages are now typically routed via 
electronic mail to appropriate action officers rather than being printed and routed 
manually. 
When the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process was first 
implemented in late 1998, the Navy used record message traffic to distribute vulnerability 
notices internally.  However, there were two problems with the use of message traffic that 
added undesirable delays.  First, the Navy is a hierarchical organization and messages 
were routed down the chain of command, from superior to subordinate.  This added 
delays at each level, as the messages had to be re-addressed to action officers at 
subordinate levels.  Second, within a command or organization, record message traffic is 
routinely addressed for action at the department head level and above.  This added 
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additional delay since the messages had to be read and then routed down to the 
appropriate network action officers within the departments at each command.  Thus, the 
use of record message traffic as a vulnerability message distribution method could take 
several days or longer, especially for commands at the bottom of the Navy’s 
organizational hierarchy. 
2. Problems with the Navy’s Tracking Phase 
Like the notification process, vulnerability compliance reporting is a time critical 
function, but it also carries the burden of accuracy and accountability for the data being 
reported.  The fundamental goal is to depict an organization’s current level of readiness 
for defense against vulnerability exploitation. This provides decision-makers with the 
ability to identify and track areas of strengths and weaknesses within their networks on a 
command-by-command basis.  The Navy’s challenge is to quickly collect vulnerability 
compliance reports from all commands and then to generate and submit a consolidated 
report that depicts an accurate view of the Navy’s status.  This has proven almost 
impossible to accomplish accurately and efficiently using traditional collection methods 
due to the Navy’s organizational structure and the large volume of reports that has to be 
processed. 
The Navy also used record message traffic as a means to collect the vulnerability 
compliance reports via the appropriate chain of command.  Each command was required 
to submit a status report to their superior that also included the compliance status for all 
of their subordinate commands.  This process suffered from a variety of problems that 
added delay, reduced accuracy and essentially eliminated accountability on a command-
by-command basis. 
First, a significant delay resulted from submitting reports via the chain of 
command.  In addition to the hierarchical delay caused by traversing the chain of 
command one level at a time, each command was also limited by the efficiency of their 
slowest subordinate.  A consolidated report could not be generated and forwarded until 
all subordinate reports had been received.  This resulted in some major delays, especially 
in those cases where there was a deep organizational hierarchy. 
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Next, there was the problem of report format.  Despite having a standard format 
specified in each vulnerability-warning message, most commands would submit data in 
an undesirable format.  For example, blank fields were skipped or deleted when a zero 
was required if no inventory was available.  In many cases, explanatory comments were 
entered in each field next to the data instead of at the end in a comment block.  Some 
reports were submitted one field per line and others contained multiple fields per line.  
Overall, the format problem went unchecked because the reports were submitted via text-
based messages that did not support field or format validation.  As a result, there was no 
way to automatically tabulate the data in the compliance reports.  So, at each level in the 
command hierarchy, an additional reporting delay was incurred due to the necessity for 
manually tabulating data received in each subordinate report. 
Additionally, in many cases the data was difficult to decipher from the reports.  
This resulted in assumptions or guesses as to what was intended, which significantly 
reduced the accuracy of the data being reported.  Furthermore, in an effort to ensure 
reports from all subordinate commands were included, there was a strong tendency to use 
the format with the lowest common denominator.  By the time the reports made their way 
up the entire chain of command, the consolidated reports consisted of little more than 
percentage estimates regarding compliance status.  For example, a consolidated report for 
an entire subordinate hierarchy might state that 82% of the vulnerable systems were in 
compliance.  This resulted in a complete loss of accountability with respect to the status 
and inventory levels on a command-by-command basis. 
3. Impact of the Navy’s Initial Implementation 
Due to the problems described above, the Navy’s vulnerability notification and 
reporting processes were failing to achieve their desired objectives.  The early warning 
system was ineffective since Navy network action officers were not receiving 
vulnerability information in a timely fashion.  The compliance status reports were not 
sufficient to depict the Navy’s level of readiness for defense against vulnerability 
exploitation.  And there was no way for decision-makers to identify and track strengths 
and weaknesses in the networks on a command-by-command basis.  Additionally, due to 
all of the delays incurred, the Navy was unable to complete the process in the required 
time for any of the vulnerabilities issued using record message traffic as the primary 
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means for information dissemination and retrieval.  As a result, Navy networks remained 
highly susceptible to exploitation, even for well-documented system vulnerabilities.  
Unless a better solution was implemented, the Navy would be unable to meet Department 
of Defense requirements for the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process. 
B. PROPOSAL: A WEB-BASED APPROACH TO THE PROCESS 
Most Navy activities are using web sites to disseminate information.  Following 
this trend, a web site could be used by the host organization to post vulnerability-warning 
messages.  However, a simple web site cannot meet the vulnerability notification 
requirements because the network action officers at each command still need to be 
notified when a network vulnerability is posted before they can take action.  To some 
extent, electronic mail (email) can support in this regard, but without knowing exactly 
who to send messages to, an organizational hierarchy will still have to be traversed in 
order to get the information to the appropriate network action officers.  Maintaining an 
up-to-date mailing list for thousands of action officers in a large and dynamic 
organization is no easy task.  Furthermore, even with an accurate list of action officers 
and their email addresses, the problems associated with forwarding and consolidating 
compliance reports will persist without some additional automated information collection 
and processing capabilities.  Thus, some type of dynamic online capability is required to 
fully address these concerns. 
1. Area of Research: Developing an Interactive Web Solution 
The major objective of this research was to design and build a web-based system 
capable of efficiently and effectively handling the vulnerability notification and reporting 
functions for all commands by specifically addressing the timeliness, accuracy, and 
accountability concerns with the Navy’s existing implementation.  There were three 
goals: (1) disseminate vulnerability notices directly to network action officers as quickly 
as possible; (2) collect compliance reports, then automatically summarize and forward the 
data; and (3) provide a secure online environment for managing the entire process.  The 
scope of this research included the use of a persistent data store and the development of 
numerous interactive web-based applications that could provide automated on-line data 
collection, with dynamic tabulation and real-time status display.  It ultimately required 
the integration of a web server, a database server, and an application server. 
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The end result of this thesis is a web-enabled early warning and tracking system 
for network vulnerabilities.  A prototype with minimal capabilities was brought online in 
September 1999.  The system has been modified and rewritten several times over the last 
year and a half and is now relatively mature and available for use throughout the Navy. It 
has been named the Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS) by its host 
organization, the Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense (NCTF-
CND).  The purpose of the system is to quickly disseminate vulnerability warnings 
directly to all network action officers and then to collect and track the vulnerability 
compliance reports from each Navy command.  The system automatically organizes, 
summarizes and presents the data according to the appropriate chain of command.  The 
hierarchical structure of the system provides each account holder with a real-time 
summary view of their entire subordinate organizational hierarchy and further allows 
them to drill down and review the individual vulnerability compliance status of any 
subordinate command.  Furthermore, it automatically prepares the consolidated Navy 
report, which the host organization is required to submit to the Defense Information 
Systems Agency. The web-based system will be described in greater detail throughout 
the remainder of this thesis. 
2. Resolving the Administrative Challenges of a Web-enabled Solution 
In developing a web-based solution, one of the major challenges was to minimize 
administrative support requirements (account registration and approval, password 
management, etc.).  This was especially important considering there would be thousands 
of account holders accessing and using it from Navy activities all over the world.  To 
overcome this problem, account administration was decentralized by distributing key 
functions down to all account holders.  This was done without jeopardizing the security 
of the system or unnecessarily burdening subordinate account holders with complex 
administrative requirements.  The distributed functions were incorporated in a 
hierarchical fashion.  This provides each account holder with the full authority to 
administer all accounts directly subordinate to them in their chain of command.  The 




C. SUMMARY OF REMAINING CHAPTERS 
The remainder of this thesis will cover the Online Compliance Reporting System 
in much greater detail.  Chapter II identifies and discusses the user requirements, the 
vulnerability process requirements, and the web-based administration requirements that 
define the structural objectives for developing the web-based applications.  It also 
describes the selection and integration of web resources used to build and support the 
system.  Chapter III walks the reader through the system implementation.  It includes 
descriptions of the key web applications that were developed and displays several 
screenshots.  Security features and recommendations are discussed in Chapter IV, along 
with lessons learned and specific proposals for future enhancements.  Chapter V 
discusses the impact the web-based system has had on the Navy and on the network 
vulnerability notification and reporting process.  It also discusses the issue of distributed 
administrative responsibility, considered by the author to be one of the primary keys to 
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II. IDENTIFYING REQUIREMENTS AND SELECTING WEB 
TECHNOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the requirements and technology that went into the design 
and development of the Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS).  The full range of 
requirements is presented.  These include the user requirements, the Information 
Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process requirements, and the administration 
requirements that are critical to the web-based approach.  Additionally, a brief discussion 
is included on the selection and integration of the server technology required for the web-
based system. 
A. IDENTIFYING REQUIREMENTS FOR A WEB-ENABLED SOLUTION 
This section discusses the user requirements, the process requirements, and the 
web-based administration requirements that have been identified and are supported in the 
current version of the system.  In addition to analysis of the vulnerability warning and 
tracking process, a build-and-fix development approach was used to derive requirements 
based on user feedback. 
1. System User Requirements 
User requirements determine the online functions that are needed to fully 
automate the process via the web.  Throughout the course of the development effort, two 
categories of clients, or user groups, are identified: network action officers and system 
administrators.  Each user group requires different access levels and specific types of 
interaction with the system.  Several different web applications will be required to 
support the different capabilities. 
a. Network Action Officers 
Network action officers represent the primary user group (well over 2000).  
Every user has network action officer privileges and responsibilities, including the system 
administrators discussed next.  These responsibilities include taking action on posted 
vulnerability messages and reporting compliance results as directed.  Therefore, action 
officers require access to the system in order to read posted warning messages and to 
submit compliance reports for their commands.  Those with subordinate activities require 
a capability to track the reporting status of their subordinates.  As a result, they will also 
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be required to identify their subordinate activities to the system.  Furthermore, network 
action officers will be responsible for managing the accounts of the action officers from 
their subordinate activities. 
b. System Administrators 
The top, or root level, organization in the system is the central authority 
for the vulnerability warning and tracking process.  The Navy Component Task Force for 
Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND) fills this role for the Navy.  Account holders 
from this organization are called system administrators.  In addition to network action 
officer requirements, they also have other special requirements that are essential to 
maintaining the system.  They require a different level of access in order to post new 
vulnerability messages, to notify all network action officers of newly posted messages, 
and to change the Navy’s organizational hierarchy (as needed). They are also responsible 
for the setup, hosting and maintenance of the system.  Additionally, they are responsible 
for handling trouble calls and providing support and/or training to network action officers 
if necessary. 
2. Vulnerability Warning and Tracking Process Requirements 
Three primary functions related to the vulnerability warning and tracking process 
are identified in support of the user requirements described above.  Each of these 
functional requirements results in one or more web-enabled applications being developed 
for the system and then made available for use over the Internet.  The block diagram in 
Figure 1 shows the Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS) inputs and outputs 
that are based on the following three primary vulnerability process requirements:  
· Provide an early warning for network vulnerabilities 
· Collect network vulnerability compliance reports 
· Track the status of vulnerable network systems 
a. Providing an Early Warning for Network Vulnerabilities 
To support web-based early warning notification process, three supporting 
requirements are identified.  First, system administrators require an application for 
posting new vulnerability messages to the system.  The application also needs the 
capability to later modify the posted messages if needed.  To dynamically track each 
network vulnerability posted to the system, the message, along with a short vulnerability 
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description, a tracking number, and due date information, needs to be stored in an on-line 
database, along with the poster’s account number (for accountability).  Next, a web 
application is required that is capable of identifying and directly notifying (via email) all 
network action officers (with active accounts) when a new vulnerability message is 
posted to the system.  And finally, another application is needed to provide all network 
action officers with on-line access to the posted vulnerability messages.  The inputs and 










B, C, E 
D 
A . New vulnerability message posted 
B . Email alert sent to all active accounts 
C. Read new vulnerability message 
D. Submit command compliance report 
E. Monitor status of subordinates 
F. Monitor status of entire Navy 
G. Generate Navy-wide report for DISA 
F, G 
 
Figure 1. The Web-enabled Vulnerability Process. 
 
b. Collecting Network Vulnerability Compliance Reports 
Collecting vulnerability compliance reports from all commands requires 
an application with the capability to present and process a standardized web-based form.  
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Input D (from Figure 1) represents the requirement for this application.  The application 
needs to auto-validate the reports submitted to the greatest extent possible in order to 
prevent errors in the data collected.  If errors are identified, the application needs to reject 
the report and redisplay the form, including the incorrect data and an appropriate error 
message. Each compliance report needs to be automatically stored in an on-line database 
along with the submission date and the network action officer’s account number (for 
accountability).  The application must first present an action officer with a previously 
submitted report, instead of a blank report form, if a report has already been submitted for 
the organization in question.  And, there must be an option to modify previously 
submitted reports.  Additionally, there must be a capability for a network action officer to 
submit a report for any subordinate command in the event subordinate action officers 
cannot access the system for any reason.  The system is required to ensure no more than 
one report is submitted for each organization per vulnerability message. 
c. Tracking the Status of Vulnerable Network Systems 
Consolidating compliance reports from all commands requires an 
application with the capability to dynamically (real-time) generate a status, or summary, 
based on all compliance reports received for a given vulnerability message.  The inputs 
and outputs, labeled E, F, and G in Figure 1, show the supporting requirements for this 
application.  The application needs to summarize and present compliance data, but only 
for the current network action officer’s command and all of its subordinate commands.  
Furthermore, the status application needs to provide a capability for an action officer to 
drill-down to any subordinate level, to display a subordinate summary view, or even to 
display a specific subordinate organization’s actual compliance report.  Subordinate 
commands with missing compliance reports need to be clearly identified in the web-
based summary report.  For the system administrators, this application will be used to 
generate the Navy-wide compliance report that will be submitted to the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA). 
3. Web-Based Administration Requirements 
Several administrative functions that are critical to the support of a web-enabled 
process are identified during early development.  Each of these functional requirements 
results in one or more web applications being developed and incorporated into the 
13 
system.  The block diagram in Figure 2 shows the system inputs and outputs that are 
based on the following administration requirements. Each of these is discussed in greater 
detail below: 
· Registering for a new user account 
· Logging in and out of the system 
· Adding subordinate commands to the system database 
· Approving pending subordinate user accounts 
· Managing passwords 
· Modifying personal account information 
· Closing user accounts 
· Changing the Navy organizational hierarchy 
· Generating a current mailing list of active users 
a. Registering for a User Account 
Every network action officer is required to register for an account using 
the online system.  In order to reduce administration, registering for an account is 
required to actually establish the user account in the database with a status of “pending 
approval.”  This prevents the account user from accessing the system until approved.  Use 
of an on-line web form is required to register for an account.  This form will be available 
from a button on the login screen.  The application that presents and processes this form 
is required to automatically validate as much information from the form as possible.  
Mandatory fields must be supplied, and verification is required.  The form contains a 
field labeled as the Unit Identification Code (UIC).  This field is used to link the user to a 
command that must already be in the system’s database.  Also, registering network action 
officers are required to make up their own user names and passwords. To enhance 
security, passwords must follow strict rules that the registration application can verify.  
Furthermore, the application will check the existing database to ensure the user doesn’t 
already have an account.  If errors or problems are identified in the input, the application 
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Figure 2. Web-based Administration Capabilities. 
 
Once the application accepts the data as valid (to the degree that can be 
automatically verified), a confirmation screen will be displayed to the account requestor, 
showing the actual name of the requestor’s command, along with the other data 
submitted.  The requestor will then have the option of modifying or confirming the 
request.  If the request is confirmed, the application will automatically send an email 
message to each account holder at the requestor’s superior command.  The email message 
will notify all of the appropriate action officers that a subordinate account request has 
been submitted and requires approval (discussed below).  Finally, the application will 
inform the requestor that the new account request has been received, the superior 
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administrators have been notified, and the account is pending final approval with 
notification to follow. 
b. Logging In and Out 
A login application is necessary in order to provide access to the system 
for users with approved accounts.  Its primary purpose is to restrict access to authorized 
users.  When used to gain access to the system, this application will provide a welcome 
screen that displays all functions for which the user has access.  This means that users 
and applications will be assigned access levels to support a run-time comparison by the 
login application.  The login application will also be required to take the user to the new 
password screen if the user’s password is flagged for expiration.  Additionally, if the 
user’s password has not been flagged for expiration, and there are subordinate accounts 
pending approval, the login application will be required to display all pending 
subordinate accounts in order to allow the user to approve or reject those accounts.  
Finally, if the user’s password is not expired, and there are no pending subordinate 
accounts, then the login application will need to display a list of the ten most recently 
posted vulnerability messages.  A button, which can be used to log out of the system, will 
be required on all screens while logged into the system.  If there is no user activity for 
fifteen minutes, the user will be automatically logged out of the system. 
c. Adding Subordinate Commands 
Since the Online Compliance Reporting System is designed to be a 
hierarchical system, a database containing hierarchical relationship information is 
required.  Because of the need to minimize administrative staff support and to have an 
accurate representation of the current Navy hierarchy, no organizational data will be 
identified or preloaded into the database.  Instead, only the top-level organization and the 
initial system administrator will be preloaded.  This will allow root level users, or system 
administrators, to register for system access.  When approved, users will then be required 
to enter a list of commands that are immediately subordinate to their own (if the list is not 
already present).  Any user at a command may do this for their subordinate commands.  
Once a subordinate command is added to the system in this manner, users at that 
command may then register for an account, and then repeat the process for their own 
subordinates when approved. 
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This recursive approach will allow for a more accurate organizational 
hierarchy while also minimizing the root level administrative staff by distributing the 
burden of responsibility to network action officers for their own subordinates.  Therefore, 
an application will be required to allow all network action officers to add and/or delete 
their subordinate commands to/from the system.  The identity of an action officer who 
adds or modifies a subordinate command will be stored with the command’s record.  This 
will provide user accountability for the organizational hierarchy stored within the 
database.  This application will also be required to disallow the removal of a subordinate 
command from the database if there are users and/or vulnerability compliance reports 
already associated with that command. 
d. Approving Subordinate User Accounts 
Approving subordinate accounts will require a confirmation process to 
ensure that each user requesting an account is authorized to have access to the system.  
This would be a tedious and time-consuming process for a central staff, especially with 
thousands of account requests coming in from Navy network action officers all over the 
world.  To eliminate the central staff requirements, and to eliminate long delays in the 
approval process, this function will also be distributed down to subordinate users.  Thus 
each network action officer will be required to approve and/or reject new account 
requests from users in commands that are immediately subordinate to their own.  By 
doing this, the burden of approval is moved much closer to the users that are requesting 
accounts, thereby ensuring the approval authority will be better acquainted with the 
requestors (i.e., more likely to know them and their authorization status).  Also, the 
thousands of account requests will be more evenly distributed across the entire user base, 
which will significantly minimize response times as well as central administrative staff 
requirements. 
As described previously, when a new user account request is made, the 
users for the superior command will be immediately notified by email that a subordinate 
account request is pending approval.  When a network action officer logs in after 
receiving one of these notices, he/she will be immediately taken to the approval 
application, which will list all pending subordinate account requests.  The user will then 
be allowed to select an account to approve (or reject) and will be taken to the account 
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validation screen.  Thus, to ensure the approval process is standardized across the entire 
organization, the online approval application will require a standard form.  The form will 
need to be a checklist that can be completed by an approver as he/she goes through the 
process of validating an account request.  When the checklist is completed and the 
approver presses the approve button, the account will be changed to an “active status” 
and the approver identity will be stored with the approved account record for 
accountability.  Then, an email message will be automatically sent to notify the account 
user that the account has been approved. 
In addition to the approval checklist and approve button, the form will 
display all of the personal information for the requestor.  There will also be a text field 
with a preformatted email message for use when a rejection is required.  The message 
may be modified to reflect why the request is being rejected before pressing the reject 
button, which will send the message, via email, to the requestor and change the account 
to a “rejected status.” 
e. Managing Passwords 
Password management would normally be done entirely by a central staff, 
but one of the requirements for this system is minimal system administrator support.  To 
achieve this, functions necessary to manage passwords will be distributed entirely to each 
individual user.  First, as described previously, each user will be required to create their 
own username and password when they register for an account.  Second, a password 
modification application will be provided to allow each user to change their password 
whenever they like (or are required to).  This application will require their old password 
(to prevent a passerby from hijacking their account) and will enforce the strict password 
generation rules used in the registration application to ensure secure passwords are 
always used.  And finally, some means of recovering a lost or forgotten password will be 
required.  To support this, a third application, which will be accessible from the login 
screen, will allow a user to retrieve a password by entering their email address in an 
online form.  If their email address matches that of an account in the system, an email 
with the password will be sent to the address and the password will be automatically 
expired.  Then, since email messages are readable if intercepted, when the user logs in, 
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he/she will be immediately taken to the password modification application to change the 
password before proceeding to other system applications. 
f. Modifying Personal Account Information 
To support changing user information, the system will be required to 
provide an application that allows users to modify their personal contact information.  By 
distributing this capability, all users will be able to change their title (i.e., from Miss to 
Mrs.), email address, and/or phone numbers as needed, thereby alleviating the central 
staff of this responsibility.  In order to maintain full accountability within the system, the 
application will not allow users to change their real names or their usernames.  For 
security, a password will be required when submitting the online form to make any 
changes. 
g. Closing User Accounts 
In the Navy, personnel transfer from one activity to another fairly often, 
especially active-duty personnel.  As a result, a means to easily close accounts for 
transferring personnel will be essential.  This will be accomplished in two ways.  First, an 
application will be provided that will allow each user to close his/her own account.  To 
do this will require a user to enter a password.  If the online form for closing a user 
account is submitted by that user, the user’s account will be changed to a “closed status,” 
and the user will be immediately logged out.  The second way to close an account will be 
via an application that allows any user to close the account of any subordinate user (but 
not peer accounts) at any level in the subordinate hierarchy.  If this method is used, the 
account being closed will also be changed to a “closed status” and will then be reflected 
as such in subordinate account listings.  Also, the identity of the user closing the account 
will be logged with the closed account.  Once accounts are closed, their users will no 
longer be able to log into the system.  The accounts will not be deleted because their 
users might have submitted reports or entered other information into the system.  By 
keeping the accounts in the database in a closed status, the accountability information 
(i.e., who did what and when) will always be available.  
h. Changing the Organizational Hierarchy 
The Online Compliance Reporting System will also need to support a 
dynamic organizational hierarchy.  In an organization as large as the U.S. Navy, 
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subordinate commands and activities occasionally shift within the hierarchy, which 
creates a new chain of command for the shifting activity, as well as all subordinates to 
that activity.  As a result, an application will be needed that can easily modify the 
organizational hierarchy on the fly.  This application will need to change the superior 
identifier for a command that is being relocated.  Furthermore, it will have to change the 
chain of command for that particular command and all of its subordinates.  This 
application will only be available to the system administrators (central staff) at the root 
level organization because commands might be required to move between two different 
subordinate hierarchies, both of which will not be accessible by the subordinate users 
involved in the organizational change.  Furthermore, this application will have to clearly 
identify potential changes that will result to the organizational hierarchy (before actually 
processing a change request).  This will allow the system administrator to verify the 
consequences prior to proceeding. 
i. Generating a Current Mailing List of Active Users 
In addition to warning notices after posting new vulnerability messages to 
the system, the system administrators will also need to notify all account users of changes 
to the system, including upgrades and/or potential down time.  As a result, an application 
will be required to dynamically generate an email mailing list of all currently active user 
accounts.  This application will only be available to system administrators, who may use 
the list that is generated to formulate mass electronic mailings to all active account 
holders as deemed necessary. 
B.  SELECTING TECHNOLOGY FOR A WEB-ENABLED SOLUTION 
A variety of hardware and software technologies are necessary to develop and use 
a fully web-capable early warning and tracking system.  This section briefly discusses the 
selection of the primary server resources that are integrated to provide the full suite of 
web capabilities.  To provide the dynamic capability required by web applications 
supporting the vulnerability notification and reporting process, and by the administrative 
applications described above, the following three server components are required.  Each 
is discussed further below: 
· A web server 
· A database server 
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· An application server 
1. Choosing a Server to Host the Web Solution 
Navy standards require the use of a Microsoft Windows NT based server for 
deploying a web-enabled system.  Additionally, the web server is required to have built-
in support for the Secure Socket Layer protocol, version three (SSL3), which allows for 
encrypted exchange of information between the web server and its browser-based clients.  
There are basically two choices that meet these conditions and carry no additional costs, 
Microsoft’s Internet Information Server (IIS), which comes with Microsoft’s Windows 
NT Server, and Netscape Communication’s Enterprise Server, for which there is a free 
government license.  The Netscape Enterprise Server was selected as the host web server 
because the Microsoft web server is not compatible with the Navy’s security certificates, 
which are required to support the encrypted SSL3 connections. 
2. Picking a Database to Store Persistent Data for Web Applications  
To provide a web-based solution that collects, retrieves and manipulates data for 
dynamic status reports from a large number of client commands in real-time requires the 
use of a database.  A database server that is Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) 
compliant can be plugged into most commercial application servers and used as a 
backend data store for web-based applications.  Furthermore, if the database is simply 
used as a repository, with no embedded business logic, the database server can be 
swapped out with just about any other database server should a higher backend storage 
capability be required.  Thus, with Open Database Connectivity as a requirement, and 
using cost-avoidance as a selection principle, Microsoft Access database software was 
chosen because it comes pre-packaged with Microsoft Office, and it is supported directly 
by the Windows NT Server software.  Microsoft Access is more than adequate for the 
initial use of the system, and it can easily be changed to a higher end solution, like 
Microsoft’s SQL Server, should the need arise. 
3. Selecting Web Application Development and Hosting Software 
An application server is needed to enable direct interaction between the web 
server and the database.  Web applications developed for the server will provide all of the 
business logic necessary to allow for automating and managing the vulnerability process 
dynamically via the web.  Given the above web server and database requirements, the 
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application server will need to run on a Windows NT Server, work with Netscape’s 
Enterprise Server, and be able to connect with a Microsoft Access database.  Everyware 
Development Corporation’s Tango Enterprise software was selected because it meets the 
above requirements.  Additionally, it is relatively inexpensive, and it is a fully cross-
platform compatible solution, which can be used for application development on 
Windows and Macintosh systems and for deployment on Windows NT, Macintosh, or 
Unix systems.  It should be noted that the Tango Enterprise software has been sold twice 
since this project began, first to Pervasive Corporation and then, more recently, to With 
Holding Corporation.  It is now called WiTango, but will be called Tango throughout the 
remainder of this document. 
The Tango software consists of two applications: Tango Editor and Tango Server.  
Tango Editor is used to develop web applications.  It runs on Microsoft Windows and 
Apple Macintosh platforms.  All of the web application development for this thesis was 
completed on an Apple Macintosh system and then transferred to a Windows NT server 
for deployment.  Tango Server is a web server plug-in (or application server) that extends 
the capability of a web server to process the web applications developed with Tango 
Editor.  The Tango Server plug-in works with most web servers that run on Microsoft 
Windows NT, Apple Macintosh and Unix systems.  It runs on the same machine as the 
web server.  Additionally, if Microsoft Access is used with the Tango Server, the Access 
database must also reside on the same machine.  This requirement does not extend to 
other Open Database Connectivity databases, which may be hosted on a separate 
machine.  For cost purposes, a single machine is used for the initial version of the web-
based system; however, it can easily be scaled for a larger client-base by migrating to a 
higher-end database running as a standalone server that supports multiple web and 
application servers. 
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the requirements for a web-based approach were identified and 
described in detail.  The specific areas covered included the requirements for system 
users, the requirements specific to the vulnerability process, and the administration 
requirements that were necessary for a web-based system.  Additionally, the technology 
resources required for developing and supporting a fully web-enabled early warning and 
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tracking system were identified.  Brief descriptions, and selection criteria, were included 
for the web server, the database server, and the web application development and hosting 
software used for the final web-based solution.  The next chapter will more closely 
examine the current system implementation and the associated web applications that were 
developed during this research. 
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III. THE ONLINE COMPLIANCE REPORTING SYSTEM 
The Navy is currently using the Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS) as 
an early warning and tracking system for known network vulnerabilities.  It was 
developed in conjunction with this thesis and is a fully web-enabled implementation of 
the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process.  The objective for this 
system is to overcome the problems of data timeliness, accuracy, and accountability that 
plagued the Navy’s original record message traffic based approach.  As a result, a variety 
of functions were converted into web-based applications and made available over the 
Internet to all Navy commands.  Of particular concern were those functions related to 
Navy-wide notification and individual command compliance reporting.  To support these 
functions in a web-enabled environment also required an extensive array of 
administrative applications for managing the online user accounts, as well as for 
maintaining a database containing the Navy’s organizational hierarchy. 
This chapter begins with a brief description of the interaction between a browser-
based client and the various servers that host the web applications.  This discussion is 
intended to provide the reader with a fundamental understanding of how web applications 
work over the network before examining the inner workings of the actual applications 
developed for this system.  Several of the key vulnerability and administrative web 
applications are then presented along with discussions on some of the background 
processing that occurs when they are used.  Each application discussed ties back to 
specific requirements provided in Chapter II, with some of the requirements being 
restated to better support the discussion. 
A.  USER INTERACTION WITH WEB-BASED SERVERS 
Before discussing the web applications developed for this system, it will be useful 
to consider the differences in the flow of data that occurs between a web browser and a 
web server for static web pages and for web pages that are dynamically generated from a 
server-based application.  The system developed for this thesis is capable of supporting 
both static and dynamically generated web pages.  The server is actually a combination of 
three different types of servers: a web server, an application server, and a database server.  
This combination provides for the dynamic page generation capability that is necessary to 
24 
support interactive web-based applications.  As a result, the web applications and the 
supporting static web pages are all accessible from the same web server.  Figure 3 
depicts the flow of data between a user and the server under both scenarios.  Also shown 
in the diagram, is the domain name, or web page address for accessing the actual web 
server.  Note that it starts with “https,” not “http.”  This indicates that an encrypted 
connection is required between the web browser and the web server.  This is one of many 
security features that will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
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capable web browser) 
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1. Requesting Static Web Pages 
In the more common use of web technology, a user, with the aid of a web 
browser, requests a page from a web server by entering a web page address (or the 
domain name of the web server).  The page, which is stored in a directory on the server, 
is simply returned to the requesting browser.  This is a web transaction that involves a 
static page, or one that does not change between user requests.  Figure 3 displays the data 
flows associated with a static page request from a user.  The flow labeled A1 indicates a 
static page request.  The flow labeled A2 indicates the web server’s response, which 
includes the complete contents of the web page. 
All that is normally required to support a static page transaction is a web browser, 
a web server, and a connection between the two.  However, in this particular case, as 
Figure 3 shows, the web server is also required to support the Secure Socket Layer 
protocol, version three (SSL3), and must also have a 128-bit certificate installed.  For the 
user, the only additional requirement is that the web browser be capable of supporting 
128-bit encryption.  Almost all web browsers currently available support this 
requirement. 
2. Interacting with Web Applications 
One of the capabilities of a web application is that it can dynamically generate a 
web page based on user input and/or other data available to the application.  This 
capability allows for real-time interaction between a user and a web server that can 
support a wide variety of information exchange options, especially if a database is used 
as a repository for the web applications.  This is exactly the case with the Online 
Compliance Reporting System.  An application server hosts numerous web applications 
for administrative and network vulnerability functions.  The applications process data 
coming from a user (via the web server) and occasionally store and retrieve data from a 
database hosted on the database server.  Based on the data processed, the web 
applications then dynamically generate a web page that is routed back to the user. 
A web application is normally triggered when a user requests a web page ending 
with a unique file extension.  In this case, the web server recognizes a request as an 
application request by the included three-letter extension “taf”, which refers to a Tango 
Application File (TAF).  As mentioned in Chapter II, Tango Enterprise provides an 
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application server and a development environment for creating the web applications that 
work with the application server. Figure 3 displays the data flows associated with a web 
application request from a user.  The flow labeled B1 is the original user page request 
containing the unique “taf” extension.  As depicted with the flow labeled B2, the web 
server recognizes the request as a web application request, and forwards it to the 
application server for processing.  The specific web application requested then processes 
the user’s request.  In doing so, it may need to interact with the database server to insert 
or retrieve data, which is represented by the optional flows labeled B3 and B4.  The web 
application then generates a response by dynamically constructing a web page, which the 
application server then sends back to the web server (B5).  And finally, as indicated by 
the flow labeled B6, the web server simply forwards the newly constructed response back 
to the user. 
A user request that only indicates a specific web application is not always 
sufficient to interact with the application.  In many cases, additional data is required from 
the user to indicate what needs to be done by the application.  The user is able to provide 
this data through the use of web forms that have input fields.  In the next section, several 
key web applications are discussed and some of the associated web forms are presented. 
B. KEY WEB APPLICATIONS 
Two categories of web applications are integrated into the web-based system’s 
application server: administrative applications, and vulnerability notification and 
reporting applications.  Administrative applications are necessary to support the desired 
web-based approach.  More specifically, these are used to manage the Navy’s 
organizational hierarchy and to control access to the system.  The vulnerability 
applications, on the other hand, provide the functional capabilities that are a required part 
of the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process.  These applications were 
developed to meet the objectives for building a web-based system; however, they cannot 
be deployed via the web without the administrative applications to support them.  The 
remainder of this section will discuss most of the web applications.  Those applications 




1. Administrative Applications 
a. Authenticating User Access 
All but two of the web applications require user authentication to prevent 
unauthorized access.  A login application was developed to support this requirement.  
The login application is called “Login.taf” and is always the first application visible to a 
system user (network action officer or system administrator).  It is actually a complex 
application that performs several tasks behind the scenes to better support the user.  The 
web form that is used to interact with the login application is shown in Figure 4.  From 
this form, users can either login or access one of the two applications that do not require a 
login, new account registration and password retrieval, both of which will be briefly 
discussed later. 
 
Figure 4. Login Screen. 
 
When the login application is activated with a username and password, the 
user is authenticated against the user accounts stored in the database.  If the user is not in 
the database, the login form is sent back to the user with an “Invalid login” message.  If 
the user’s account is in a “pending” status, a web page is sent back to the user indicating 
that the account has not yet been approved.  Also, if the user’s account has a “closed” 
status, a message informing the user that the account has been closed is returned.  
Otherwise, the user is authenticated and the application server establishes a session key 
and several session variables that are used to track the user through the system.  To 
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maintain the user connection and state, the session key is sent back and forth between the 
user and the server with each subsequent request. 
After a successful login, the user will then automatically be taken to one of 
three other applications (each of which will be discussed briefly in the remaining 
sections).  If the user’s password has been marked for expiration (a result of using the 
password retrieval application), the user will first be required to create a new password.  
For security reasons, this takes precedence over the other two options.  Next, if the user’s 
command has any new subordinate account requests that are pending approval (as 
determined by checking the database), the user will be presented with a list of those 
accounts that are pending and asked to process the requests.  Otherwise, the user will be 
presented with a list of the ten most recent vulnerability messages (most recent at the top) 
that were added to the database.  This automated application selection process ensures 
that critical tasks are always presented to the user on a priority basis and serves to remind 
the user of pending requirements. 
To logout of the system, a user is simply required to click the “Logout” 
button.  This will run the “Logout.taf” application, which will delete the user’s session 
variables on the server and send the user back to the login screen.  The “Logout” button is 
at the right end of the button menu, which appears at the top of every screen in every 
application after logging in.  The button menu is created by the “Menu.taf” application, 
which is called by all of the other applications in addition to the login application.  This 
approach allows new applications to be added to the menu without requiring 
modifications to existing applications. 
b. Registering for a New Account 
An application called “Register.taf” is responsible for handling account 
registration for new users.  It is one of the two applications that do not require login 
access.  Registering for a new account could normally be a tedious process for both the 
requestor and the approver.  However, great care was taken during the development of 
this web application to automate account registration to the greatest extent possible and to 
minimize the requirements.  First, the information required by a registrant was reduced to 
just enough data to fully identify the user.  The objective was to have a relatively clean 
and inviting web form with as few fields as possible.  Furthermore, it was desired to only 
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require information that was already known to or immediately available to the registrant.  
By making the process simple and concise, it was hoped that new account registrants 
would be enticed to use the system as soon as possible without delaying registration due 
to complex forms and/or difficult to locate information. 
The online account registration form is shown in Figure 5.  It fits on a 
single screen and includes concise instructions, highlighted in a red font, just above each 
field.  All but two fields are required, the title field and a second phone number field, 
which many users might not have.  The registrant is simply required to enter name, email 
and phone number data, followed by an organizational identifier.  Then the registrant is 
allowed to make up a user name and password for accessing the system. 
 
Figure 5. New Account Registration Form. 
 
The Unit Identification Code (UIC) field is the only piece of information 
that might not be immediately known to every registrant; however, every Navy activity 
has one.  It is a unique six-digit string that is used to link the user to a Navy command, 
which must already exist in the database.  The code is readily available throughout most 
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Navy commands.  It is also on the military orders for all active duty personnel and is 
commonly required on administration forms.  Using this code instead of the command 
name allows the system to automatically validate the user’s command and prevents errors 
due to misspelled command names.  When the registration form is submitted, a 
confirmation screen is presented to the registrant with the actual command name, as 
identified from the database (using the code provided by the registrant).  If the code is not 
in the database, the registrant is informed to first verify the Unit Identification Code 
entered and then to contact an administrator (network action officer) at the next level in 
the chain of command to have it added to the system (see the next subsection). 
The registration form also describes the specific format requirements for 
the user name and password fields.  These fields are automatically validated when the 
form is submitted to ensure the format is followed.  In fact, when a registration form is 
submitted, a whole series of checks are performed to validate the request as much as 
possible.  First, all required fields are checked to ensure they were not left blank.  Next, 
the format of the user name and password fields is validated.  Then the database is 
queried against the email address and user name fields to ensure there are no matches 
with existing accounts.  Both of these fields are required to be unique.  Requiring a 
unique email address helps to prevent a user from establishing multiple accounts.  And 
finally, the database is queried for the command name using the code as described above.  
If the validation process is successful, the user is presented with a confirmation screen to 
personally verify the request, including the actual command name and the name of the 
next activity in the chain of command.  If validation fails, the registration form is 
redisplayed with the original information (minus the password for security reasons) and a 
detailed error message with instructions is included above the form in a bright red font. 
If the registrant presses the “Confirm” button on the confirmation screen, 
the account registration application creates an account in the database for the requestor 
and assigns it a “pending” status.  An email is then automatically generated and sent to 
the network action officers at the next level in the chain of command to inform them of 
the pending account request. 
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c. Building a Subordinate Organizational Hierarchy 
As mentioned above, a user cannot register for an account unless the 
user’s command is already in the database.  However, one of the requirements previously 
discussed was that no command data could be preloaded into the database.  This resulted 
in the development of the subordinate application, called “Commands.taf”, which allows 
a network action officer with subordinate reporting commands to enter those commands 
into the database.  And, once the commands have been entered, the subordinate network 
action officers from those commands can then register for an account.  The idea was to 
start this process at the top of the Navy’s organizational hierarchy and continue down 
until every command was in the system.  In this manner, there would be a highly accurate 
accounting of the commands within the organizational hierarchy because all network 
action officers would have direct control over the list of subordinate commands for which 
they were responsible.   
The image shown in Figure 6 is the first screen presented to a user when 
the subordinate application is used.  As shown, it provides the information identifying the 
user’s command, which can be edited by the user.  Next, the screen lists all network 
action officers from the user’s command.  The user can look up personal contact 
information from the accounts of the other network action officers that are listed; a 
capability that is provided via an auxiliary application called “ViewAcct.taf”.  And 
finally, the screen also lists all of the commands that are subordinate to the user’s 
command.  From this section of the screen, the user can add new subordinate commands, 
or choose to view the same screen for one of the listed subordinate commands.  This 
latter capability allows a user to drill down to the lowest levels of the subordinate 
organizational hierarchy with relative ease.  When directly viewing a subordinate 
command, a user is also provided with the capability to close the network action officer 
accounts listed for that subordinate command. 
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Figure 6. Command Information Screen. 
 
When using the subordinate application to add a new command to the 
system, only two pieces of information are required, the Unit Identification Code and the 
Plain Language Address (PLA) for the command, which is simply an official command 
name.  The identification code is required to be unique and is validated as such by the 
application upon insertion.  The subordinate application automatically assigns the 
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currently viewed command (as seen in Figure 7) as the superior command for any 
command added to the system.  In addition, a special rapid indexing field is automatically 
created and stored in the database with the new command record.  This field is used in a 
variety of ways to efficiently retrieve data from the database for an entire organizational 
hierarchy using a single query without having to traverse the hierarchy on a query-by-
query basis. 
 
Figure 7. New Command Form. 
 
d. Approving Pending Subordinate Account Requests 
Approving accounts is a very critical part of the system’s overall security.  
It is essential that administrators only approve those accounts for authorized subordinate 
personnel.  In a more traditional system, the approval process would likely entail 
forwarding an account request up the chain of command.  Then, an administrator at the 
top level would verify that the request had been authorized at each level along the way 
before actually establishing the user’s account.  This approach is not used because it 
would be extremely difficult for a small group of administrators at the top level of a large 
organization like the Navy to personally verify each and every account request.  This 
system takes a completely different approach to new account approval.  Instead of 
recommending approval and forwarding a request up the chain of command, the 
immediate superior of a user is given the administrative requirement to actually approve 
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the account in the system.  As discussed in Chapter II, there are many advantages to this 
approach; however, a robust and easy to use application is required to ensure that proper 
procedures are followed during the account approval process.  The account approval 
application, called “Approve.taf”, was designed to meet these requirements. 
The approval form depicted in Figure 8 is displayed to a user (network 
action officer at any command) when a pending subordinate account is selected for 
approval processing.  All of the information the user needs to approve or reject the 
account is available on the screen.  There is a checklist, which must be followed.  The 
checklist is part of the approval form that will be processed when the form is submitted to 
the approval application.  Each of the items in the checklist must be checked off.  By 
checking these items and submitting the form, the user is permanently signing his/her 
name to the requestor’s account as the approval authority, which provides accountability 
to the process (since it is stored in the database).  Also, at the bottom of Figure 8, there is 
a form for rejecting the account request if the current user is unable to properly complete 
the checklist for the pending subordinate account request. 
When a pending account is approved, its status is changed to “active” in 
the database and the approved user is then able to login.  Additionally, an email is 
automatically sent to the email address of the approved user.  The email informs the user 
that the account is approved and available for use.  It also contains some helpful 




Figure 8. Subordinate Account Approval Form. 
 
e. Other Administrative Applications 
There are several additional administrative applications designed based on 
the system requirements.  Each of these web applications is briefly discussed here, but no 
screen shots are provided.  For more specific information on these applications, refer 
back to the requirements in Chapter II. 
The “Account.taf” application allows users to modify personal 
information within their own accounts.  The information that may be changed with this 
application includes the user’s title (or rank), either of the user’s phone numbers, or the 
user’s email address.  The user must enter a password to make any changes.  From within 
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the “Account.taf” application, a user can access the “Close.taf” application, which simply 
allows a user to close his/her own account.  Once again, the user’s password is required. 
The “Move.taf” application is only available to system administrators 
from the Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense, the host 
organization.  It allows for the reassignment of a command within the organizational 
hierarchy.  In other words, it changes the chain of command.  When used, it also 
automatically changes the chain of command for all subordinate activities of the 
command being reassigned. 
A password retrieval application, called “LostPass.taf” was developed so 
users could automatically retrieve their passwords if they could not remember them.  This 
is the second of two applications that are available without being logged in to the system.  
Another password related application is called “Password.taf”.  It allows users to change 
their passwords when desired.  It also follows the same password verification rules that 
the “Register.taf” application does during the account registration process. 
2. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert Applications 
a. Early Warning 
The vulnerability process begins with an early warning phase that is 
intended to notify all network action officers of identified network vulnerabilities.  This 
system implements this capability; however, it does not detect network vulnerabilities.  It 
simply fulfills the information dissemination requirement of the early warning phase.  It 
automates this task by first storing the vulnerability information in a secure online 
database and then notifying all network action officers (via electronic mail) to login, read 
the vulnerability message, and report compliance with the protective measures described 
within the message.  The web application that supports this part of the process is called 
the “IAVAs.taf” application. 
One of the capabilities of this application is to post and/or modify 
vulnerability messages to the online database.  This portion of the application is restricted 
to system administrators.  Figure 9 shows the web form used to post or modify a 
vulnerability message to the web-based system.  Other than a few fields for categorizing 
the vulnerability, the form is designed to accept the message in its original format.  When 
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this part of the application was first designed, it was intended to automatically create and 
send emails to all active network action officers in the system database after a 
vulnerability message was posted using the form.  However, despite several different 
approaches, the Tango Enterprise software has thus far proven incapable of efficiently 
and reliably handling this task due to the large number of network action officers in the 
database.  As a result, a temporary solution has been implemented until the problems with 
the automated approach can be fully resolved.  The temporary solution employs a 
separate application, called “Mailing.taf”, which dynamically generates a mailing list of 
all active users.  The mailing list application is also restricted to system administrators, 
who use the generated mailing list to broadcast the early warning notices.  This manual 
fix only requires a few additional minutes; however, a fully automated mailing capability 
is still desired. 
 
Figure 9. New Vulnerability Form. 
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After network action officers receive the email notices that follow the 
posting of vulnerability messages, they can login to the system and read the messages.  
The web application also supports in this regard by listing all vulnerabilities in the 
database (most recent first).  The network action officers can then select the vulnerability 
message they are interested in.  Then they can either read it, or they can access the 
compliance reporting and tracking capabilities that are specific to that vulnerability. 
b. Compliance Reporting 
Every command in the Navy is required to submit a compliance report for 
each vulnerability posted to the system.  To support this requirement, a web-based 
reporting application was developed.  It is called “CmdRpt.taf,” and it is accessible from 
within the “IAVAs.taf” application (mentioned above).  This approach allows a report to 
be linked (automatically by the system) to a specific vulnerability.  Figure 10 shows the 
web form used by the reporting application to collect compliance report data from a 
command.  As can be seen, the identifying vulnerability information is already included 
in the header section of the report form.  In addition to a specific vulnerability, a 
compliance report is also required to be associated with a particular command.  To ease 
the reporting process and to prevent inaccurate command information being entered by a 
network action officer, the command identity is automatically assigned by the system.  
As shown by Figure 10, the command identity is also already included in the header 
section of the form. 
Originally, the reporting application simply assigned the current user’s 
command identity to a report being submitted by that user.  However, based on user 
feedback, a new requirement forced a change to this approach.  For various reasons, some 
commands could not access the system and instead were required to send their reports to 
a superior command.  The action officers at these superior commands thus required a new 
capability to submit the reports to the system (by proxy) for their subordinates.  This was 
achieved by allowing the reporting application to instead assign the identity of a selected 
command vice the user’s command.  As a result, any network action officer now has the 
capability to submit a report for any command in their subordinate hierarchy.  
Accountability is still maintained because the identity of the network action officer that 
submits or modifies a report is always recorded with the report.  Selecting a subordinate 
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command (to submit a proxy report) is only available from within the vulnerability status 
tracking application, which will be discussed next. 
 
Figure 10. Vulnerability Compliance Report Form. 
 
c. Vulnerability Tracking 
The “Status.taf” application allows network action officers to track 
subordinate vulnerability compliance status.  This application automatically summarizes 
data from all reports up to the command level of the network action officer using the 
application.  In other words, the entire subordinate hierarchy is included in the summary.  
The user of the application can drill down to any level and see the summary as it pertains 
to a subordinate command, but cannot go above his/her own organizational level.  This 
approach provides a real-time status at each level in the organizational hierarchy; 
therefore, depending on the user’s level in the chain of command, a different scope will 
be presented. 
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One of the governing principles in developing the status application was to 
place all of the information that might be needed at the user’s fingertips.  The screen shot 
displayed in Figure 11 is the result of this principle.  The information is broken out into 
four areas.  The top of the screen shows the current vulnerability and the current 
command to which the remainder of the status display applies.  The section just below 
this provides the next two key areas of information.  First, there is the required summary 
of the compliance status (inventories) from the subordinate commands that have already 
submitted reports.  At the top level in the Navy, these are the numbers required by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to be reported to the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA).  Next is the total number of required reports, as determined by the number of 
commands in the subordinate hierarchy.  This number is used to calculate the total 
number of missing subordinate reports, which is highlighted in red.  In the bottom 
section, there is a list of the commands that are immediately subordinate to the current 
command.  The list clearly depicts whether each subordinate has submitted a report.  
From this section, a user may look at or submit a subordinate command’s individual 
report.  The user may also lookup the contact information for all network action officers 
from any subordinate.  And finally, the user may drill down to see the status screen as it 
applies exclusively to any given subordinate command and its own subordinate hierarchy. 
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Figure 11. Status Tracking Screen. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed applications developed for the Online Compliance 
Reporting System and how they worked to accomplish the complete set of vulnerability 
warning and tracking requirements in a web-based solution.  It included a brief 
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description of the information flow process between the various servers and between the 
web server and the users when an application is used.  Additionally, several of the key 
applications were discussed, and developer insight into implementation decisions was 
provided.  There is much more to this system than presented here, but the applications 
discussed provide the best foundation for presentation of this thesis.  The next chapter 
will closely examine the security aspects of system and will then discuss some of the 
lessons learned during development and use of the system.  Proposals for future 
enhancements will also be discussed. 
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IV. SECURITY, LESSONS LEARNED, AND FUTURE 
ENHANCEMENTS 
This chapter discusses the security features of the Online Compliance Reporting 
System (OCRS).  Several recommendations for enhanced security capabilities are 
provided.  The security section is followed by a discussion on lessons learned from the 
use of this system.  Recommended solutions to user problems are included with the 
lessons learned.  In addition, the final section details several proposals for future 
enhancements based on user feedback. 
A. SECURITY 
There are many features employed in combination to provide a layered approach 
to security for this system.  The objective is to restrict access to persons who are 
authorized to use it.  This includes the protection of information from being read as it is 
transmitted back and forth across the network.  Although the data contained in the online 
database is not classified, it should be considered sensitive because, like other 
Department of Defense (DoD) information, it might be possible to abuse it when viewed 
in conjunction with other sources.  Additionally, by maintaining controlled access to the 
data, it is much easier to ensure the validity of the vulnerability compliance reports 
received by the system.  An integrated Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) approach would 
address most security concerns; however, the related support technology has not fully 
matured.  The system can be adapted to take advantage of the Public Key Infrastructure 
in the future.  In the interim, a variety of features were used to address security.  The 
remainder of this section discusses the following security features and related concerns: 
· Internet domain restrictions 
· Encrypted web server connections 
· Password format validation 
· Ensuring password confidentiality 
· Auto-expiring user session credentials 
· Account hijacking protection 
· Automated password retrieval 
· Database security 
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1. Internet Domain Restrictions  
The first security feature encountered by system users is an Internet domain 
restriction.  All clients who access the web server must reside within the “.mil” domain.  
The web server does a reverse Domain Name Service (DNS) lookup to verify that each 
client browser resides on a computer from the “.mil” domain (i.e., cs.nps.navy.mil).  If 
the computer being used is from any other domain, it is immediately denied access.  
Although this may not restrict a determined and technically knowledgeable individual 
from outside the “.mil” domain, it does serve to generally restrict access to the subset of 
the Internet population that requires access to the system.  Additionally, if necessary, the 
restriction could be further tightened to allow only users from the “navy.mil” domain. 
2. Encrypted Web Server Connections  
The next feature employed provides for encrypted connections.  The web server 
uses the Secure Socket Layer (SSL3) protocol to establish encrypted connections with the 
web browsers used by the network action officers.  The server has a 128-bit security 
certificate and web browsers are required to support 128-bit encryption.  As a result, all 
data that travels across the network between the web server and the web browsers is 
encrypted.  This makes information in transit very difficult to intercept.  It helps prevent 
passwords from being “sniffed” by network-monitoring devices.  It also helps prevent 
analysis of all the vulnerability data being transmitted back and forth.   
3. Password Format Validation 
To help prevent the use of passwords that can be easily guessed or passwords that 
may be prone to a common word, or dictionary-style attack, the web applications impose 
strict password formatting rules.  This is intended to save users from themselves by 
forcing them to make up passwords that are more complex and therefore more secure.  
Currently, passwords (and user names) are required to be eight to twelve characters long.  
Additionally, the passwords must be composed of letters and numbers, with at least two 
of each required.  Password security can be further improved with modifications to the 
“Register.taf” and “Password.taf” applications to impose additional requirements for 
password formats.  For example, a longer password can be mandated, or the inclusion of 
one or more special characters (like any of these: “!@#$%&*?”) can be required to 
further increase the complexity of the password. 
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4. Ensuring Password Confidentiality 
To help maintain the confidentiality of passwords, online forms that require a 
password make use of a special field that hides the password from view as it is being 
entered.  This helps prevent “shoulder-surfers” from snatching passwords.  Additionally, 
if a form containing a user’s password is rejected and needs to be redisplayed for data 
entry corrections, the password is required to be re-entered.  This prevents the web server 
from sending the rejected form back with the user’s password embedded in the web page.  
Although the password would not be visible from the page when it is redisplayed in the 
web browser, it would be visible by viewing the source code for that page.  This feature 
also prevents passwords from being stored in a browser’s web cache.  And finally, the 
web applications never format web forms to use the “GET” method when submitting the 
forms.  When the “GET” method is used, it adds each field as a parameter to the web 
page address.  These fields are then visible in the browser’s web page address line when 
the next page appears.  Thus, if a form containing a password were submitted using the 
“GET” method, the password would be visible.  Furthermore, the password would 
automatically be stored in the browser’s link history file, and possibly even in the 
bookmarks (or favorites) file.  To prevent these security concerns, the web application 
forms always use the “POST” method, which transmits the form fields to the web server 
without appending them to the web page address. 
5. Auto-Expiring User Session Credentials 
Each time a user logs into the Online Compliance Reporting System, a new 
session is started on the server to track the user.  A unique session key is created and sent 
back to the user.  It is passed back to the server with every page request from the user and 
is normally stored on the user’s machine in the form of a temporary “browser cookie”.  
The application server also embeds the session key within every web page sent to the 
user in the event that “browser cookies” are disabled.  The session key is used to uniquely 
identify the user.  It is used to track session variables on the server that maintain the 
connection state between the user and the server.  The session variables are initialized 
upon login.  Without the session key and its associated session variables, a user cannot 
access the web applications and will automatically be redirected to the login screen for 
any application request.  Every application request checks the user’s session credentials.  
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This allows the server to differentiate between system administrators and network action 
officers.  As a result, system administrator applications are protected from normal user 
access.  Furthermore, the session variables are automatically deleted after fifteen minutes 
of user inactivity, which invalidates the session key.  This is designed to protect the 
system if a user walks away from his/her browser for an extended period of time after 
logging in.  The fifteen-minute delay can be reduced if a tighter restriction on an 
unattended session is desired.  It is a configuration parameter on the application server. 
6. Account Hijacking Protection 
Steps were also taken to protect a user’s account when logged in and left 
unattended prior to the fifteen-minute automatic session expiration.  The logged in user’s 
personal information (i.e., email address, etc.) cannot be changed without the user’s 
password.  Additionally, the password cannot be changed, nor can the account be closed 
without entering the user’s current password in the required onscreen forms.  Taking 
these precautions prevents a secondary individual from hijacking a user’s account when 
left logged in and unattended; however, it does not prevent a secondary individual from 
viewing the data in the system and/or submitting or modifying a report.  If any data is 
changed or submitted, it will be tagged (for all to see) with the identity of the network 
action officer whose account was used.  The action officer may then be held accountable 
for the changes.  This provides a good incentive not to leave a connected session 
unattended.  It is possible to prevent unauthorized data entry under these circumstances 
by requiring modifications to add password fields to all data entry forms.  If a password 
is required to be on all forms, then the web applications that process the forms will also 
require modifications to authenticate the user when submitted.  If these changes were 
made, a secondary user would not be able to submit or change data, but would be able to 
view the data already in the system. 
7. Automated Password Retrieval 
This system provides an automated password retrieval function, as required, to 
alleviate system administrators of this responsibility.  It allows users to retrieve their own 
passwords in the event they cannot remember them.  To do so, a user must enter his/her 
email address.  The “LostPass.taf” application then locates the account with that email 
address, retrieves the password, and then emails the password to the email address.  This 
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is fairly secure because, even though a secondary individual might be able to enter a 
user’s email address, the password is never displayed.  It is always emailed to the user’s 
email address and cannot be retrieved by the secondary individual unless he/she has 
access to the user’s email account.  This provides another reason for user’s to secure their 
computers before leaving their desks.  Therefore, to hijack a user’s password would 
normally require a secondary individual to be on a computer in the “.mil” domain, to 
know a user with an account, to know the user’s email address, and to have access to the 
user’s email account to retrieve the password. 
In a significantly less likely scenario, a more sophisticated hijacker might be 
successful by “sniffing” packets off the network.  This vulnerability exists because the 
email message containing the password is transmitted “in the clear” to the user.  In other 
words, the email message is not encrypted.  To help mitigate the risk associated with this 
concern, when the “LostPass.taf” application is used to retrieve a password, the password 
is marked for expiration.  As a result, when the user retrieves the password and logs in 
he/she will be automatically taken directly to the “Password.taf” application and asked to 
change his/her password due to the potential for compromise resulting from the email 
message.  The user could ignore the request and simply go to another application; 
however, each time the user logs in, the “Password.taf” application will be automatically 
activated until the user changes his/her password.  It is possible to tighten the security of 
this approach by modifying “Password.taf” to lock users out of their accounts if they do 
not change their passwords immediately after the first login following use of the email 
password retrieval capability. 
To completely eliminate the vulnerability associated with email-based password 
retrieval, the “LostPass.taf” application could be rewritten to provide an online retrieval 
method based on a series of several unique questions (more is better), with answers only 
known to the account user.  The “Register.taf” and “Password.taf” applications would 
require modifications to support user entry of the answers that would be needed to 
authenticate the user during password retrieval.  This approach would require careful 
consideration of the questions used to ensure the answers could not be easily guessed, 
especially since this would essentially be an alternate method for logging in to the 
system.  Additionally, it would be best to simply allow a user to immediately create a 
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new password after the question and answer authentication.  This would avoid displaying 
the current password in the user’s web browser and most likely also storing it in the 
browser’s cache.  The security of this approach would rely totally on the number and 
quality of the questions and the confidentiality of the answers used to authenticate users. 
8. Database Security 
The current version of the Online Compliance Reporting System employs a 
Microsoft Access database to store information, including all user account information.  
The database is located on the web server, which is physically outside the host firewall 
security perimeter.  If the host machine for the web server were successfully 
compromised, the intruder would likely have access to the entire database.  Destruction 
of data is not a major concern due to the twice-daily backup procedure followed by 
system administrators; however, confidentiality of the accounts is a concern.  A 
significantly more secure approach to hosting the database would be to install it on a 
separate machine and place it behind the firewall.  This is not possible using Microsoft 
Access with the Tango Enterprise software; however, almost any other Open Database 
Connectivity (ODBC) compliant database can be used.  To support this change, the data 
would have to be loaded into a new database and all of the web applications would have 
to be redirected to the new data source.  Using this approach, only the web server, the 
application server, and the web applications would be exposed, while all of the data 
would be secure in the confines of the firewall.  Even if the web server’s host were 
compromised it would be extremely difficult to gain access to the database without a 
valid account, especially since the passwords would also be safely located in the firewall-
protected database. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM USER INTERACTION 
The problems encountered by users of the Online Compliance Reporting System 
can be generalized into two main categories: training and network access.  This section 
discusses the lessons learned in these areas.  According to the system administrators at 
the host organization, the issues described only affected a very small percentage of the 





The system was put together with ease-of-use as one of the major guiding 
principles; however, it was soon clear that the author did not accurately anticipate how 
every single user would react to and interact with the provided interface.  The online 
screens are laid out uniformly across all applications and onscreen instructions are 
provided where deemed helpful.  The onscreen instructions are highlighted using a red 
font.  Onscreen clutter is minimized by using a single menu bar at the top and by 
including no graphics.  Additionally, with each new account approved, the application 
server automatically sends an email message to the user.  The message contains concise, 
detailed instructions for how to get started. 
As reported by the system administrators at the Navy Component Task Force for 
Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND), a significant majority of the users have been 
able to access and use the system with no additional training other than what is 
automatically provided as described above.  However, there have been a small percentage 
of users who have required help from the system administrators.  The system 
administrators reported that, in almost all cases, had the troubled users simply taken the 
time to read the email and/or the onscreen instructions (rather than rushing through the 
screens), they would have been able to do it on their own. 
The system administrators have also recently noticed that a small number of users 
have closed accounts, and then opened new ones.  In many of these cases, this occurred 
because the users had provided incorrect email addresses and then could not remember 
their passwords.  With no way to automatically retrieve their passwords, they simply 
opened new accounts and then had their old ones closed by a superior.  Although there 
are only a few of these and there is no loss of accountability, this does result in redundant 
data in the database.  Contacting the system administrators could have easily restored the 
original accounts. 
In an effort to better address the above problems and any other common questions 
from the users, the system administrators are preparing a list of Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), which will be posted to the web server’s home page.  Additionally, a 
monthly system status report will be prepared and sent by email to all active account 
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holders.  The email will also include common and helpful hints for using the system 
properly. 
2. Network Access 
The only major technical problem that has been encountered is one in which the 
web server denies a valid user access to the system.  In reality, it is not actually a 
technical problem with the server, but an implementation policy that results in a denial of 
access when a certain technical problem exists with the end user’s own local network 
configuration.  For security reasons (as mentioned above), Navy policy requires that web 
servers restrict access to users from the “.mil” domain exclusively.  The system’s web 
server follows this policy, which requires the server to do a reverse Domain Name 
System (DNS) lookup on the Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with each client 
(user) request.  If the lookup does not return a “.mil” domain (e.g., nps.navy.mil) for the 
host of the client, then the client is not allowed to access the system.  There have been 
quite a few cases where users were unable to gain access because they were not resolving 
to the “.mil” domain despite actually using a client computer on a “.mil” network.  In all 
cases, the problem was a result of improper network configuration on the user’s end.  The 
networks had to be reconfigured to accurately report the “.mil” domain when queried. 
There were also some special cases where users simply did not have access to a 
“.mil” computer.  These cases resulted in changes to the web applications to allow 
network action officers at senior organizations to submit reports for subordinates by 
proxy.  In other cases, users have only had intermittent access.  At the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) for example, access from Spanagel Hall is intermittent, but access from 
Root Hall or from the dial-in modem bank is always available.  The system 
administrators at the Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense have 
dealt with this issue extensively and work closely with users to help them correct the 
problem whenever possible.  Some level of intervention from the user organization’s 
network administrator is almost always required. 
C. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS 
This section contains several proposals for enhancing the current capabilities of 
the Online Compliance Reporting System.  They are based on recommendations made by 
users.  Some of the proposals are already in the early planning stages for future addition 
51 
to the web application suite.  The following five proposed capabilities are currently being 
considered: 
· Additional reporting capabilities 
· Acknowledging receipt of compliance requirements 
· Consolidated compliance status displays 
· Variable user access privileges 
· Mandatory periodic password changes 
1. Additional Reporting Capabilities 
In the author’s opinion, the hierarchical administration functions provide the real 
foundation for the system’s overall success.  They have been designed to support any 
type of reporting process for which the desired reports can be specified in a standard 
format.  As a result, the system is especially suited to handle inventory, status, and 
acknowledgment types of reports, which are very common to the Navy and other 
Department of Defense (DoD) organizations.  The system provides a real-time, online 
capability with automatic recording of accountability data that includes the organization, 
the action officer, and the date and time for each report submitted.  The reports collected 
are automatically summarized according to organizational hierarchy; and a drill-down 
capability is included to allow viewing of each individual report from subordinate 
activities.  Due to the system’s flexibility, adding a new reporting capability is fairly 
straightforward but does require copying and modifying a couple of the existing 
applications, which can serve as templates.  Applications to support a new Tasking Order 
compliance capability were recently added in this manner (this will be discussed briefly 
in the next chapter).  The effort to do so required only three days.  Similar reporting 
capabilities can be added using the same approach. 
2. Acknowledging Compliance Requirements 
To further enhance the accountability of the system, the host organization has 
requested a modification that will allow the system to automatically record a timestamp 
when a network action officer accesses a vulnerability message that has been posted.  The 
timestamp will serve as an acknowledgement that the vulnerability information has been 
reviewed and any required action is being taken.  Additionally, it is desired that the 
summary report, as well as the individual reports, reflect current status of these 
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acknowledgements.  These modifications will allow system administrators to track the 
notification portion of the vulnerability process without having to wait for compliance 
reports.  As time becomes a factor, the system administrators will then be able to 
proactively notify those organizations that have not accessed a time-critical vulnerability 
after a certain period of time.  This enhancement is considered a top priority and is 
currently in the initial planning stage. 
3. Consolidated Compliance Status Displays 
Many users have requested the addition of a single-page, consolidated compliance 
status report covering their organization and their entire subordinate command hierarchy.  
As previously shown, the current status report displays an organizational summary 
followed by the individual status of only those activities that are immediately subordinate 
to the organization currently being displayed.  This is a very concise display, but it still 
provides access to the more detailed subordinate reports.  With the current approach, a 
user can select any immediate subordinate to drill-down and view the same type of 
summary report from the subordinate’s hierarchical view.  The problem is that a user 
cannot see everything at once (on the same screen).  The original prototype contained the 
consolidated report version, but it was modified to it’s current form at the request of a 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) N6 staff officer, who felt that the consolidated format 
would generate too much information (overload) for the higher level organizations.  The 
consolidated status report is currently being planned as an option, but will most likely 
only be provided after other higher priority requirements.  Additionally, a similar 
consolidated report is being planned, which will allow a user to view their individual 
organization’s status for all network vulnerabilities in a single report rather than having to 
look them up individually. 
4. Variable Access Privileges 
Several flag officers and other senior Navy officials have requested the addition 
of read-only accounts.  These accounts are expected to allow for executive-level Navy-
wide review of the network vulnerability early warning and tracking process in real-time 
without having to query system administrators.  This is a high priority requirement with 
no quick and easy solution because there are currently 24 different applications working 
together on the server and most would require modification, some quite extensively.  
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These applications must be evaluated from a systemic perspective to determine the extent 
of any required changes before proceeding. 
5. Mandatory Periodic Password Changes 
In order to increase system security, system administrators at the host 
organization have requested automated password expiration capabilities. Currently, a 
password change is only required after a user activates the password retrieval function, 
which forces the user to change the password after the next login.  There are two 
additional automatic password expiration capabilities that have been requested.  The first 
is one that would require passwords to be changed after a certain period of time, every 90 
days for example.  And the second is one that would allow system administrators to force 
a system-wide password expiration that would require all account users to immediately 
change their passwords.  Both options are being explored by the author and are likely to 
be added as future enhancements. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the Online Compliance Reporting System security features were 
described along with some recommendations for increasing the overall security posture 
of the system.  Lessons learned during operational use of the system were also discussed.  
Plans to help alleviate the primary concerns with user training were included.  
Additionally, several proposals for future enhancements were provided.  The next chapter 
will address the impact the system has had on the Navy and, in particular, the Information 
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V. IMPACT ON THE NAVY 
This chapter addresses the impact of the web-enabled Information Assurance 
Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process on the Navy.  It contains an extensive summary of 
the Navy’s progress with the ongoing operation and use of the Online Compliance 
Reporting System, a now fully web-enabled early warning and tracking system.  
Following the summary is a section discussing administrative responsibility and, more 
importantly, the distribution of that responsibility throughout the Navy’s organizational 
hierarchy.  In the author’s opinion, this is a factor that has played a critical role in the 
success achieved with the web-based system.  It has greatly impacted the Navy’s ability 
to use the system without requiring additional administrative resources. 
A.  THE NAVY’S PROGRESS USING A WEB-BASED APPROACH 
This section describes the progress and success the Navy has experienced in using 
the Online Compliance Reporting System as an early warning and tracking system for 
network vulnerabilities.  The following key themes are discussed: 
· Navy chooses from two potential web solutions 
· Web-based system is available to every command in the Navy 
· New system requires minimal administrative support 
· System flexibility supports addition of new tasking order capability 
· Code Red: a Navy network defense success story 
· Web system garners positive feedback and Navy-wide awareness 
· Successful system generates interest from other organizations 
1. Navy Chooses from Two Potential Web Solutions  
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) developed a web-based system 
called the Vulnerability Compliance Tracking System (VCTS).  In purpose, it is similar 
to the one developed for this thesis; however, it differs because it is designed from the 
ground up to be a centrally managed system.  As a result, the personnel hosting the 
system are responsible for administering all user accounts.  It is also an inventory-based 
system.  In other words, it requires users to maintain an up-to-date inventory of all 
network systems.  Then, whenever a new vulnerability is posted to the system, it will 
warn users of the vulnerability, but only those that have the vulnerable systems listed in 
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their inventories.  This is a proactive approach; however, if the inventories are not 
current, the network action officers may not be properly notified and, as a result, may not 
respond with the required compliance reports.  On the other hand, the system developed 
for this thesis is a mandatory reporting system.  It notifies all network action officers 
whenever a new vulnerability is posted.  Additionally, it requires compliance reports 
from all commands, even negative reports.  The system builds an inventory (of 
vulnerable systems) based on the reports received.  This approach ensures all vulnerable 
systems are immediately identified, evaluated, and corrected by network action officers 
when a new vulnerability is posted.  It also provides for a more comprehensive and 
accurate assessment of the actual network systems in use at the time. 
DISA offered to host their system as a service to other organizations.  This offer 
was extended to the Navy for an annual cost of $400,000.  At the time, the author had 
already completed an early prototype of the system based on this thesis.  Both systems 
were demonstrated for staff officers from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) N6 
office.  After carefully weighing the merits and costs, the early prototype, that would 
ultimately become the Online Compliance Reporting System, was selected for use by the 
Navy.  The Navy Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense (NCTF-CND) 
hosts and administers the current version of this system, which reportedly costs less than 
$15,000 per year to operate.  This choice has resulted in annual savings of $385,000 for 
the Navy.  Also, the host system administrators have reported that they are experiencing 
close to a 100% success rate for the entire Navy (in terms of the number of systems 
accurately accounted for with each vulnerability posted).  They have also reported that 
DISA is using their own system internally for vulnerability notification and compliance 
reporting, but is only experiencing about a 60% success rate for their agency. 
2. Web-based System is Available to Every Command in the Navy 
As of this writing, there are 1382 Navy commands using the current version of the 
web-enabled early warning and tracking system.  That represents every U.S. Navy 
activity in the world, with no known exceptions.  From these commands, there are 
approximately 1600 active user accounts (and growing).  Many commands have more 
than one account.  There is no limit to the number of accounts allowed per command, but, 
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for various reasons, some commands have no accounts.  Instead, they send their 
compliance reports to their superiors, who submit them to the system by proxy. 
3. New System Requires Minimal Administrative Support 
Discussions with the host administrators revealed that there are currently only 
three personnel who are responsible for managing the Online Compliance Reporting 
System, and then only as a collateral duty.  Between them, during peak access times, they 
spend no more than two and a half man-hours each workday managing the system.  The 
peak times are rare and tend to occur just before a vulnerability-reporting deadline.  The 
typical daily administrative support time is usually much less than that required during 
peak times.  Administrative duties include performing backups twice a day, monitoring 
system logs, handling any trouble calls, posting new vulnerabilities, reporting Navy-wide 
compliance to DISA, and responding to specific queries from Navy leadership regarding 
Navy-wide compliance status and/or vulnerable system inventories. 
4. System Flexibility Supports Addition of New Tasking Order 
Capability 
To date there have been 24 Navy-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability 
Alerts (network vulnerabilities) posted using the new system.  In addition, the web-based 
system has been recently enhanced to support notification and compliance tracking for 
Navy-wide Tasking Orders that are issued by the host organization (Navy Component 
Task Force for Computer Network Defense).  Tasking Orders are specific directives that 
must be responded to by each Navy command.  Each Tasking Order requires a 
compliance report.  The Tasking Order enhancement was possible because the 
administration portion of the system was designed to be flexible enough to handle any 
type of distributed hierarchical reporting process that can be reduced to a standard 
reporting format.  Since the new Tasking Order capability was added, system 
administrators have issued six Navy-wide Tasking Orders using the web-based function.  
Early indications are that this new capability is working just as effectively as the already 
proven network vulnerability warning and tracking capability. 
5. Code Red: A Navy Network Defense Success Story 
To illustrate its successful impact, the lead system administrator, Navy Lieutenant 
Commander Jacqueline Butler, reported that the new web-based system is playing a key 
role in protecting the Navy’s networks.  It was used to defend against the recent 
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worldwide “Code Red” worm attacks that were targeted against Microsoft’s Internet 
Information Servers (web servers).  The Online Compliance Reporting System was used 
to warn all Navy commands of the potential vulnerability to Microsoft web servers.  All 
commands were required to install the appropriate software patch on their servers and to 
report compliance status via the web system’s reporting capabilities.  The reporting 
deadline passed before the worldwide “Code Red” attack occurred.  As a result of this 
effort, it was reported that the “Code Red” worm successfully attacked only 7 out of 3200 
Microsoft web servers throughout the Navy.  Furthermore, the seven servers that were 
successfully attacked had been reported (using the web system) as being in compliance 
by their respective host commands; therefore, the threat warning process worked as 
planned and had the network action officers at those commands succeeded in properly 
installing the patches, no Navy servers would have been infected. 
Without this system, the Navy would not have succeeded in warning the 
appropriate network action officers, at all commands, of the pending threat, nor would the 
commands have been able to install the patches and complete the compliance reporting 
process prior to the “Code Red” attack.  Additionally, the Navy would not have had 
immediate access to the entire Navy-wide inventory of vulnerable Microsoft web servers.  
The web-based inventory provided a real-time status of the Navy’s posture for defending 
against the “Code Red” attacks.  To further underscore the success of the Navy’s effort, 
according to Lieutenant Commander Butler, the Air Force and Army fared much worse 
than the Navy during the attacks despite having the same amount of time to complete the 
vulnerability notification and compliance reporting process.  Both were still using manual 
methods to implement the process; therefore, they did not have access to real-time 
statistical and inventory data regarding the numbers, locations, and status of the 
Microsoft web servers within their organizations. 
6. Web System Garners Positive Feedback and Navy-wide Awareness 
Overall, the user feedback for the Online Compliance Reporting System has been 
very positive.  In general, the network action officers are extremely pleased with the way 
they are able to interact with the web-based system.  In fact, many have asked to modify 
the system to support other requirements.  Some of the changes requested have already 
been implemented.  For example, network action officers now have the ability to close 
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subordinate accounts and they can now drill down to manage any level within their 
subordinate organizational hierarchy.  Several other requests are still being considered. 
Navy leadership is now keenly aware of the system and its capabilities.  Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) N6 staff personnel routinely contact the host system 
administrators requesting vulnerability compliance status and inventory information.  The 
information provided is being used to proactively ensure Navy-wide vulnerability 
compliance as well as to measure the effectiveness of the network security policies and 
procedures within the Navy.  As a result of this high level of visibility, flag officers from 
several senior Navy organizations have requested the addition of root level read-only 
accounts to provide them with direct access to real-time Navy-wide vulnerability 
compliance status without having to go through a host system administrator. 
7. Successful System Generates Interest From Other Organizations  
The Navy is currently the only organization that is collecting and reporting the 
complete set of compliance data required by the Department of Defense (DoD) for 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts.  This is directly attributable to the successful 
implementation of the Online Compliance Reporting System.  Other organizations are 
currently reporting little more than percentage compliance estimates (i.e., 80% compliant 
throughout the Army) based on the manual reports they receive.  After seeing the new 
web-based system successfully used by the Navy and viewing a demonstration, several 
organizations have expressed interest, including the Army.  In addition, the Air Force has 
decided to build a similar system.  Also, the Navy Reserves have expressed interest in 
adapting it for other purposes.  As a result, the system’s host command (Navy 
Component Task Force for Computer Network Defense) is interested in extending the 
current capabilities.  They are planning to budget continued support and development 
through the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Center in Charleston, South Carolina. 
B. CRITICAL FACTOR: SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In the opinion of the author, the ultimate success of the Online Compliance 
Reporting System has depended heavily on shifting the burden of responsibility for 
administrative tasks from the central system administrators at the host command to the 
network action officers throughout the Navy. The action officers at the various levels of 
the Navy’s organizational hierarchy use the system to submit reports for their commands 
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and, more importantly, to monitor the reporting status of their subordinates. They have a 
vested interest in actively accepting the administrative responsibilities for managing 
subordinate user accounts because they are ultimately responsible for the reporting status 
of their subordinate commands.  As such, since their primary objective, with respect to 
the vulnerability reporting and tracking process, is to get the required information 
reported up the chain of command as quickly as possible, it is to their advantage to 
proactively use a system like the one developed for this thesis.  However, to do so, they 
must be provided with access to the administrative functions needed to support their 
efforts.  This web-based system provides them with the automated administration and 
management tools they need to fully support requirements for the vulnerability 
notification and reporting process and other similar processes.  
By successfully shifting the burden of responsibility from central system 
administrators to, in this case, over 1600 network action officers, an on-line, web-enabled 
system provides significant leverage to a distributed hierarchical notification and 
reporting process for a large organization.  In fact, the more administrative functions that 
can be distributed to all action officers, the more automated the system can become from 
the end user’s perspective while also significantly minimizing the requirement for a 
dedicated central staff. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the progress the Navy has made with the Online 
Compliance Reporting System, and the successful impact the system has had on the 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process within the Navy.  Additionally, the 
issue of distributed administration throughout a large hierarchical organization was 
discussed.  It was presented as a critical success factor for the overall impact of the web-
enabled solution provided by this thesis.  The next chapter will discuss the author’s 
conclusions for this research. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The successful initiation and continuing operation of the Online Compliance 
Reporting System (OCRS) has demonstrated that a network vulnerability early warning 
and tracking capability for a global organization can be achieved using web technology.  
More importantly, it has shown that distributed and hierarchical administration 
techniques significantly reduce centralized system support requirements while also 
maintaining a high degree of accountability and security.  The system was designed to 
overcome the problems of data timeliness, accuracy, and accountability that hampered 
the Navy’s original record message traffic based approach to the Information Assurance 
Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) process.  To achieve this in the context of a web-enabled 
solution, there were three specific goals: (1) disseminate system vulnerability notices 
directly to network action officers as quickly as possible; (2) collect compliance reports, 
then automatically summarize and track the data; and (3) provide a secure online 
environment for managing the entire process.  These goals are tied directly to the 
system’s early warning, tracking, and administration capabilities, respectively. 
A.  WEB-ENABLED EARLY WARNING 
The Navy’s original early warning capability was ineffective due to the delays 
incurred when record message traffic was used to disseminate the warnings.  Routing the 
network vulnerability messages via the Navy’s organizational hierarchy, and then 
through commands to the network action officers, could take several days or more, 
especially for those at the bottom of a deep hierarchy.  This is a significant delay 
considering the overall 30-day time limit for the entire process and the scope of 
compliance reporting requirements involved. 
The web-based solution derived from this thesis has brought the early warning 
time down to within a few minutes of the release of a vulnerability-warning message.  In 
fact, network action officers throughout the Navy now receive email warnings before the 
messages are actually transmitted via the record message traffic network.  This is possible 
because the new system automatically tracks all network action officers that use the 
system to report vulnerability compliance data.  Since each user is required to have a 
valid email address (which is verified during the account approval process) the system 
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can dynamically generate a mailing list of all active accounts when a new vulnerability is 
posted.  The mailing list is then used to distribute the early warning emails to all network 
action officers in the Navy.  This rapid information dissemination capability provides a 
great advantage for the web-based approach.  It partially addresses the issue of timeliness 
and fully accomplishes the first goal of the system. 
B.  WEB-BASED NETWORK VULNERABILITY TRACKING 
The web-based early warning capability leaves more time to accomplish the 
reporting and tracking of vulnerability compliance data.  However, it does not address the 
delays associated with the reporting process, nor the accuracy or accountability of the 
data being reported.  The reporting delays resulted from the hierarchical roll-up of data 
(via the chain of command) and were also affected by the efficiency of the slowest 
reporting subordinate.  The inaccurate data resulted from a systemic failure to adhere to a 
strict reporting format, which could support automatic tabulation.  This problem was 
exacerbated because the record message traffic reporting method could not enforce a 
format or validate the data prior to submission.  The loss of data accountability was also 
tied to improperly formatted reports, which resulted in guesses as to original intent and 
led to very generalized status reports that could not be broken down by command. 
The Online Compliance Reporting System completely eliminates reporting delays 
associated with submitting reports via the chain of command.  Each report submitted 
using the system is automatically stored in a database.  As a result, real-time status 
reports are dynamically generated at all levels in the chain of command.  The information 
is available, even at the highest level in the chain of command, immediately after each 
report is submitted.  There is no longer a need to wait for all subordinate reports before 
forwarding a consolidated report to the next level.  In fact, there is no longer a need to 
forward reports.  The system eliminates this requirement by automatically building 
summary reports based on all reports received.  This addresses the data timeliness 
concerns pertaining to delays introduced by the vulnerability reporting process. 
The use of a well-structured form provides the basis for strictly enforcing a 
reporting format when using the web-based system.  This allows a web application to 
validate the data being submitted before accepting the report.  Additionally, if the data is 
valid, the web application stores a record of the report in the database.  This allows other 
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applications to automatically tabulate the data for dynamic status reports while also 
maintaining a copy of each individual report received.  Furthermore, the identity of the 
command and of the action officer submitting the report are automatically linked to the 
report.  As a result of this approach, the remaining problems with data accuracy and 
accountability are addressed and the second goal of the system is fully accomplished. 
C.  DISTRIBUTED ADMINISTRATION FOR A WEB SOLUTION 
The majority of the development effort for the Online Compliance Reporting 
System was geared towards providing the administration capabilities necessary to ensure 
the security of the system and the accountability of the information it is collecting.  As a 
result, proper identification and authentication of every user is critical to the success of 
the web-based solution.  Every network action officer requires an account, which allows 
secure access to the restricted system.  Unfortunately, there is minimal administrative 
support available at the system’s host organization to manage the thousands of accounts 
that are needed for all of the participating commands in the Navy.  Thus, a unique 
approach to managing the accounts is required. 
System security is provided using several layers of features to restrict access to 
authorized users while protecting the data and, more importantly, the accounts used to 
submit the data (refer to Chapter IV).  However, managing the user accounts 
(registration, account approval, passwords, organizational hierarchy, etc.) needed to 
access the system presents a significant challenge in light of the limited central support 
staff and the large number of accounts.  To solve this, account administration is entirely 
decentralized.  Administrative functions are distributed down to all account holders in a 
hierarchical manner.  The system maintains the organizational hierarchy and requires 
network action officers to manage all accounts for users immediately subordinate to 
them.  This has proven highly effective because it evenly distributes the administrative 
load throughout the entire Navy organizational hierarchy.  This distributed administration 
approach accomplishes the third and final goal for developing a web-enabled solution. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The Online Compliance Reporting System has successfully addressed the 
problems with the Navy’s initial Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert 
implementation.  As such, it has fulfilled the promise of a web-enabled early warning and 
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tracking system for network vulnerabilities.  Additionally, the distributed administration 
capabilities that were incorporated into this web-based system have significantly reduced 
the administrative support requirements for managing a hierarchical information 
dissemination and collection process.  As a result, not only does the system solve the 
network vulnerability notification and reporting problems, but it also provides an 
excellent platform for tackling similar concerns in other web-enabled systems.  The 
fundamental ideas and experiences gained can also be used as a model for other 
applications of Business Process Reengineering (BPR).  For example, the web-based 
distributed administration capabilities provided with this system offer an excellent 
technical foundation for the Web Enabled Navy (WEN) initiative.  This initiative, also 
known as Task Force Whiskey, is an effort to build a Navy web portal to leverage the 
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the fleet’s Information 
Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) network. 
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